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Media Studies and 
the Dialogue of Oemocracy 
John /. Pauly 
T hough dialogic approaches have widely intluenced the study of communication, they have left a fainter mark on studies of the mass 
m edia. 1 p ropase to investigate the reasons for this neglect. The i.ndifference, 
truth be told, has tlowed in both directions. For much of the 20th century, 
media scholars focused on matters of institutional structure, regulation, policy, 
economics, law, ideology, and effect. These traditions of research implicitly 
positioned dialogue as an epiphenornenon, a soft social process less constrain-
ing, explanatory, or decisive than the hard architecture of politicaJ economy, 
social structure, and cognitive disposition. Dialogue studies, for their part, have 
often treated the mass media asan iconic Other, the very embodiment of the 
impersonal social relations that undermine mutuality. The media, in their 
noisy ubiquity, have been imagined to crowd out and devalue the truly human. 
The cultural turn of the last 20 years has opened a different moment, how-
ever, in which media and dialogue scholars might make common cause. The 
criticaJ versions of media studies continue to insist that powerful structures 
restrain and determine our forros of communication (and a troubled world 
offers up ample evidence for their gloomy predictions). But hope finds voice, 
too. Scholars in both traditions seek reasons to imagine more fluidly responsive, 
decent, just, and participatory modes of human action. And the two have come 
to recognize shared assumptions. Both believe, after all, that humans "word" the 
world together, that our sense of self is emergent and contingent, and that our 
persistent, existential struggle, as creatures, is sirnply to make sense. 
My chapter traces tlús trajectory of indifference and rapprochement. I 
want to explain why media and dialogue studies for so long neglected each 
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other, and why, today, they increasingly find themselves in each other's company. 
1 use my own work in journalism studies to illustrate the process by which 
media scholars have reframed older questions in ways that dialogue scholars 
might find resonant. In particular, 1 reference the ongoing debate over public 
journalism as an example of how media studies has incorporated insights 
familiar to dialogue scholars. And 1 close with ideas about how dialogue scholars 
might treat the media as a legitimate object of study-that is, as something 
more than an emblem of their discontent. 
Dialogue and the Problems of Scale 
Before 1 explore what has kept dialogue and media studies apart, let me debunk 
the stereotype that we sometimes imagine divides the two, so that we might 
consider other realrns of difference. lf we ask, "What is it about the media that 
discourages dialogue?" the conventional answer might be "Everything." 
Dialogue values face-to-face communication and cultivates one-on-one 
encounters, even when conducted in groups. The media feel Like one-to-many; 
the message goes out to the audience members as a group, but they do not talk 
with one another. Dialogue is direct, a person-to-person encounter. The media 
are, well, mediated; they rely on technology rather than interpersonal commit-
ment as their mode of connection. Dialogue values depth in the relations it 
fosters. The media settle for shallowness; they measure their own success in size 
and wealth of the audience gathered rather than personal transformation 
achieved. 
The scale of the media arouses special concern. How does one encourage 
mutuality, active listening, and responsiveness among newspaper, magazine, 
radio, movie, and television audiences that range from the thousands to the 
tens of millions? Scholars have often judged such gatherings as incapable of 
producing dialogue (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; 
EUul, 1985; Kaplan, 1994; Postman, 1985). This judgment resonates with a 
longstanding commonplace of American and European thought that inter-
prets large-scale media as emblems of a mass society (Bramson, 1961). Older 
terms like mass communication may wither year by year, but the concept per-
sists. Indeed, the phrase the media still denotes much the same set of social 
practices as mass once di d. When they talk about "the media," most Americans 
mean massive, heavily capitalized, technologically sophisticated, professionally 
managed, star-driven systems of communication. They think of the company 
newsletter, parish bulletin, video yearbook, pizza delivery flyer, yellow pages, 
personal website, wedding DJ, or small scholarly journal as something else-as 
means of communication, but not media. Even when we apply the term alter-
native media to smaller systems that audiences invest with special significance, 
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we imagine them as an alternative to the extensive technologies, permanent 
organizations, market relations, and professional expertise of"the media." 
Do the terms media and dialogue mark incommensurable modes of com-
munication? Perhaps they simply respond to different scholarly questions. For 
example, technology plays a more obvious role in media studies. Scholars 
attend closely to the making of such products as news stories, television 
programs, movie soundtracks, and magazine ad vertisements. Dialogue 
requires little technology, but it does depend upon cognate forms of social 
organizatio n that Lewis Mumford (1952) used to call technics-the ordering 
practices that bind groups with art, language, ritual, and work, even in the 
absence of machines. Scholars often take for granted the technics of dialogue. 
In public deliberation projects, for example, the expertise of white-collar 
professionals has created the occasion, format, and ground rules for dialogue. 
Before participants speak one word, others have spent weeks or months setting 
the stage for their conversations. Projects such as the National Issues Forums 
(Mathews, 1994; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997, pp. 169-180) employ expert mod-
erators; planners who use phone, Internet, and fax to arrange housing, travel, 
and food; and scholars and journalists who write and assemble the preliminar y 
materials. The forums, in other words, capitalize the speech of ordinary 
citizens in the same ways that universities routinely capitalize the speech of 
their professors. Further, such forums regulate the style of talk (especiaUy if 
participants prove too performative or agonistic), and they train moderators to 
forestall eruptions of incivility. 
Thus it seems improbable, to me at least, to think of dialogue as a pure, 
natural, uncorrupted realm that we enter once we shed the artífice of the 
media. Dialogue is every bit as "rnade" as any technology. Any attempt to divide 
technology from technics, to place the machine on one side and the human on 
the other, misses how we actually üve. Nor can we easily discover, in modern 
societies, a domain of autonomous, genuinely personal experience that stands 
apart from our involvement with media. Participants come to dialogue with 
sensibilities and knowledge shaped by their use of mass-produced books, 
movies, and magazines as weU as by ever-rnore years of formal education . The 
fact that participants talk about their experience as uniquely and authentically 
personal does not diminish this point. Manufacture<.l knowledge and cxperi-
ence now speaks th rough all of us. 
That is our dilemma, as creatures. We live in a world of widely circulated, 
objectified symbolic forrns whose very existence testifies to their weight and 
importance. We wonder about our place in that world, suspecting that it makes 
us more tha n we make it. Our problem is not merely epistemologicaJ-a 
philosopher's debate about what we know and how-but painfully spiritual, 
for our sense of ethics depends upon retaining sorne sense of moral agency. My 
own conception of dialogue emerges from just such dilemmas of modern 
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experience. 1 think of dialogue as a fine word for humans' deep, persistent, and 
self-reflexive attempts to come to terms with the world and one another. 
Scholars' descriptions of dialogue-as immediacy of presence, mutual impli-
cation, vulnerability, genuineness (Cissna & Anderson, 1994a, pp. 13-15)-
emphasize that our very humanness is at stake. Whether we believe in a god or 
dogma matters not; neither theism nor atheism gets us off the hook. The best 
we do is talk our way through uncertainty and chaos. 
1 study the mass media beca use, improbably enough, they offer themselves 
as an apt object with which to contemplate modernity and its paradoxes 
(Jensen, 1990). In their form as well as their content, media render the social 
order visible and public, as cultural studies so often suggest. They also offer us 
moral dramaturgy-forms of symbolic action by which groups fashion them-
selves. This is a way of seeing the world that 1 learned from my teachers, James 
Carey and the late Al Kreiling, and that they learned, in large part, from 
pragmatist philosophers such as John Dewey, William James, and George 
Herbert Mead; sociologists such as Charles Horton Cooley, Robert Park, and 
W. l. Thomas; and assorted eccentrics such as Lewis Mumford, Kenneth Burke, 
and Hugh Duncan. These intellectuals were among the first to understand that 
the radical uncertainty of modernity demands a dialogic response. When 
change puts group identity in play, individuals must renegotiate their relations 
with an ever wider array of disparate others. They turn to the mass media 
to discover new styles of identity, in the process finding new occasions for 
symbolic display and conflict. 
Above all, thinkers in this tradition feared the eclipse of the public, demo-
cracy's privileged representation of its shared civic life. Mary Ryan ( 1997) has 
posed the issue succinctly: 
Was it possible for so diverse a people, with such different beliefs and competing 
interests, to mold themselves into one public, even a harmonious circle of publics? 
Would the decentralized practices of democratic associations create pandemo-
nium ora working coalition? Can a public composed of men and women sepa-
rated by their different resources and flagrant inequities operate in a truly 
democratic manner? (p. 17) 
American pragmatists, symbolic interactionists, and cultural critics believed that 
dialogic communication offered an answer. Carey ( 1997) finds a powerful exam-
ple of their hopes for democracy in the work of John Dewey. For Dewey, Carey 
argues, "Communication was an ethical principie. Whatever inhibited communi-
cation, whatever inhibited the sharing, widening, expansion of experience was an 
obstacle to be overcome" (p. 31). Despite its limitations and anomalies, this faith 
in the power of human connectedness and civic life has animated my research, 
and constitutes my own deepest commüment to dialogue. 
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The Dominant Traditions of Media Research 
What ultimately divides dialogue and media are the contrasting intellectual 
traditions from which each has grown. Philosophy gave birth to dialogue studies; 
our converging interests in political theory, ethics, and hermeneutics have nur-
tured it; and our experience with professionally managed talk.ing therapies 
have lent ita familiar form. Media studjes owes much mo re to history, law, and 
the social sciences. Discourse about the media has taken shape at different si tes 
and rnoments. The field emerges notas a theory of language and thought, but 
as a running cornmentary on historically specific experiences of republican 
governrnent, rnachine technology, free markets, immigration, leisure and 
entertainment, war, and social reform. In media studies, theory and practice 
often prove indistinguishable. Professional, academic, critic, and aficionado 
share the same podium. Media studies, as a field, offers a palimpsest of mem-
ory, law, canon, and custom on which every policy, narrative form, cultural 
conflict, and organization has left its mark. These discursive habits are partic-
ularly visible in three theoretical traditions that have shaped the field: liberal 
traditions of free expression, the political economy of media orgaruzations, 
md the sociology of audiences. 
Centuries-old debates over free expression have set the terms with which 
we continue to understand the significance of the mass media. Free speech, 
assembly, and press began as practica! political accomplishments-attempts to 
wrest from crown and church the conditions of one's own making. The incom-
pleteness of the liberal revolution- its slowness to recognize all the forms of 
humanness-does not dampen its reverberations. Unrestrained voice contin-
ues to serve as a universally recognizable signature of human freedom. (Does 
this story not anímate our hopes for dialogue, too?) Jürgen Habermas (1989) 
has famously theorized this history asan invitation toa public sphere, an imag-
ined civil order governed by uncoerced discourse, reason, and law. The new 
forms of political o rganization-citizenship and parliaments and parties and 
constitutions-made this rnoment palpable but did not exhaust its meaning. 
Implicit in the ideal of free expression was a new conception of social and 
moral identity-a sense that humans would no longer be considered fallen 
creatures, and society could be understood as the group life that humans 
choose rather than inherit (Unger, 1987). Even marginalized groups such as 
African Americans have turned to print and publication to fix their place in 
history and compel o thers to recognize their presence (Gates, 1990). 
I have told the story this way to emphasize the moral dramaturgy associ-
ated with free speech. Unrestrained voice intoxicates us with the possibilities of 
human liberation. Not surprising, then, that the media have worked so hard to 
forge themselves into emblems of that freedom and guardians of its traditions. 
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The exercise of free speech and press has proved so incendiary that it has often 
incited violence, induding mobbing of editors, duels, destruction of news-
paper offices, press sabotage, and the assassination of reporters (Nerone, 1994). 
Today, the media invoke the rhetoric of freedom to describe their every adap-
tation to changing markets and mores. Thus we commonly hear that the press 
is the only business specificalJy protected by the constitution (because its 
freedom matters so much to us), that television viewers freely choose which 
programs to watch, that objective reporting encourages a free flow of ideas, and 
that the public interest is served best when media corporations are left to com-
pete with one another in a free market. In each case, media organizations trade 
on the rhetoric of freedom, whether or not their behavior actualJy encourages 
human liberation. 
The second literature I wish to reference, on media economics and organ-
izational structure, considers the material conrutions of human symbol-making, 
describing aiJ the ways that modern societies industrialize, bureaucratize, and 
capitalize their cultural practices. The earliest accounts of media organizations 
grew out of political economy and the study of law and regulation. Such insti-
tutional approaches often interpreted media systems as the lengthened shadow 
of a nation's política! ideology. For instance, the widely influential Four 
Theories of tire Press (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956) categorized each 
nation's press system by its commitment to authoritarian, classical liberal, or 
social responsibility principies. As com.mentators have noted (Nerone, 1995), 
Four Theories too easiJy fit its conceptual categories to the political common-
places of the Cold War. Nonetheless, this approach governed studies of the 
international press and broadcasting for many years, and criticaJ theories of 
media still assume that ideological and market forces uJtimately determine 
media performance. 
Like the free expression tradition, scholarship on media organizations 
works with historically specific referents.ln the 19th century, for example, the 
United States and Europe steadily diverged in their organization of telegraph 
and telephone systems, after starting with similar postal systems. In Europe, the 
national post offices absorbed the telegrapb and telephone into their state 
monopolies, in part to guarantee access for military purposes. The United 
States forthrightly committcd itself to an expensive, universal, federal postal 
system as an indispensable infrastructure of republican government (John, 
1995; Kielbowicz, 1989). But in 1844, Congress refused Samuel Morse's offer 
to seU his telegraph patents to the American government (Thompson, 1947). 
The development of the telegraph as a priva te system wouJd inflect Americans' 
approach to every subsequent electrical and electronic technology. The debate 
over ea eh new invention-telephone, radio, sound recording, television, satellite--
would rehearse similar choices. Today we ask whether privately owned portals 
and content providers shouJd be allowed to structure public access to the 
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Internet, a system originally sponsored by agencies of the U.S. government 
And Europeans ponder the consequences of allowing satellite television 
providers to compete with state-supported broadcasting systems. 
1 have noted that for many years scholars interpreted media organizations 
as the projection of a nation's political and economic beliefs. Since the 1970s, 
however, studies of media organizations have taken a different turn. Without 
fully renouncing institutional approaches, scholars have studied media organi-
zations as dynamic systcms, responsive to externa1 market pressures, of course, 
but also driven by interna! routines, divisions of labor, technologies, and 
professional values. Production studies typically focus on tbe routine manu-
facture of media artifacts rather than the creation of artistically exceptional 
single works. They interpret each meilia product as a remnant left by the organ-
ization's practices, a trace of the bureaucratic negotiations that produced it. 
This app roach allows greater weight to professional values, noting their inter-
section with organizationaJ roles, routines, budgets, and production practices. 
One can find dozens of examples of this approach applied to journalism alone 
(e.g., Darnton, 1990; Ericson, Baranek, & Chan, 1989; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; 
Schudson, 2003; Soloski, 1997; Tuchman, 1978). But one also finds similar 
studies of music (Faulkner, 1971; Peterson, 1997), television entertainment 
(Cantor, 1971; Elliott, 1972; Gitlin, 1983), movies (Powdermaker, 1950), 
magazines (Lutz & CoUins, 1993 ), advertising (Arlen, 1980; Hirota, 1988), and 
public relations (JackaU, 1988). 
Dialogic theory offers little that resembles this literature on political eco-
nomy and organizational bureaucracy. ln a sense, dialogue hopes to escape the 
sociological by emphasizing the emergent and wondrous over than the normal 
and routine. That is also why scholars committed to poütical economy or 
production approaches may find dialogic models unconvincing. The problem 
is not so much that dialogue studies are indifferent to questions of power-
a charge recently addressed by Hammond, Anderson, and Cissna (2003). 
lntellectual sensibility, and self-styling, ilivide the traditions. Scholars who 
study media organizations beüeve that claims about economics and organiza-
tional structure always dwarf other forms of explanation. Political economy, 
in particular, prides itself on maintaining a tone of realpoL;tik. ln the work 
of scholars such as Robert McChesney ( 1993, 1999; McChesney & Nichols, 
2002), Nicholas Garnham (1990, 2000), or Noam Chomsky (2002; Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988), economics and ideology always count for more than culture, 
interaction, narrative, interpretation, or dialogue. 
From the perspective of dialogue studies, this must seem a domineering 
conception of the real. It identifies power as the key issue- perhaps the only real 
issue-that media scholarship should address. Political economy declares life's 
material demands as inescapable, and its existential demands as evanescent. 
When scholars do examine the talk that occurs within media organizations, 
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they typically study it instrumentally, as a behavior that helps the organization 
perform its tasks. The dozens of newsroom studies, for example, rarely treat 
journalists' discourse as self-reflective or ethical ( e.g., Bowers, 1998). The 
working assumption of production studies, true enough, is that media work is 
hectic and stressful. Participants meet their deadlines only by relying upon 
standard routines, quick decisions, and taken-for-granted conceptual cate-
gories. But ultimately media professionals talk in order to complete their tasks, 
rather than to discover something about themselves or others. 
lt is in the third literature, audience studies, that media scholars discover 
reasons to consider a more dialogic approach. Since the early 20th century, 
social scientists have been interested in audiences-who they are (both demo-
graphicaJJy and existentially), what they read and watch, how they use media, 
how they learn. Commercial media have found it advantageous to answer such 
questions to measure and package their audiences for advertisers (Converse, 
1987). One gets a rough sense of the audience literature by putting its 
keywords--effects, information, and culture-in historical progression (Carey, 
1989, pp. 37-68}. From the 1920s to the 1950s, behavioral studies of media 
effects on attitude, opinion, and behavior dominated. 1 n the 1950s and 1960s 
researchers began employing cognitive approaches to study learning, framing, 
and agenda-setting. By the 1970s cultural approaches emerged to account for 
the media as forms of sense-making. All three approaches continue to coexist 
today, capitalized and encouraged by different professional and academic 
constituencies. 
Despite their obvious and much-studied differences, each of these para-
digms hopes to understand the relation of content and audience. Behaviorists 
treat content as the stimulus that produces an audience response; cognitivists, 
as a conceptual frame that reorganizes the audience's mental schema; and cul-
turalists, as a symbolic world that invites play and identification or, in critica! 
versions, sutures the audience to ideology. In each case, media content leads to 
something. lt influences consumer buying, changes our vote, makes a lifestyle 
attractive, frames our conception of poütical issues, establishes our common 
sense about the world, or offers narratives that render experience intelligible. 
Cultural studies has a special stake in such work, for content offers the audi-
ence symbolic models of reality. In content, cultural studies discovers stories 
about how we live, including any number of dark tales of juvenile delinquency, 
sexual crossings, ethnic conflict, consumer ecstasy, violence, and propaganda. 
1 do not intend to survey the sprawling landscape we have cometo call cul-
tural studies, or to track its numberless progeny. Let me briefly note, however, 
two related areas of media studies, not so easily categorized, where one finds 
strong dialogic influences. One school, following the lead of MarshaU 
McLuhan {1951, 1962, 1964) and Walter Ong (1967, 1977, 1982), has come 
to be known as "medium theory» or "media ecology." It explores the ways 
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in which different media physiologically and psychologically engage their 
audiences (e.g., Gozzi, 1999; Meyrowitz, 1985; Postman, 1985, 1 992; Strate, 
Jacobson, & Gibson, 1996). Another school, even more loosely assembled, uses 
contemporary literary criticism to describe the audience's co-construction of 
media texts. Television scholar Horace Newcomb ( 1984) was one of the first to 
use Bahktin and Volosinov to describe how media texts engage audiences. The 
work of John Fiske (1987, 1989a, 1989b) wouJd similarly theorize the audi-
ence's interactive relation to television and other forms of popular culture. And 
in the 1990s scholars wouJd apply postmodern perspectives to new electronic 
media (Poster, 1990, 2001), often searching for signs of community in cyber-
space (Jones, 1995, 1997, 1998; Marcus, 1996; Smith & Kollock, 1999). 
Media studies such as these have readily incorporated dialogic insights. But 
many media scholars also consider such work somewhat tangential to their con-
cerns, unless it also engages questions of economics, history, law, and organiza-
tional structure. Nonetheless, cultural approaches, broadly considered, have 
fundamentally altered the field. Many media scholars now acknowledge the 
centrality of human symbol-making, treat reality as co-constructed and emer-
gent, and recognize the multiplicity and fluidity of the self. Theoretical purists 
will still find reasons to disagree, of course. Cultural studies may pro test that 
dialogic theory's invitation to escape sociological reality prevents us from con-
fronting the institutional forces that constrain us. And dialogic theory might 
understandably weary of the cultural studies two-step: its habit of paying lip 
service to a theoretically fluid , socially constructed reality, but always discover-
ing a determinative ideological order that disciplines the play of meaning. 
Journalism and the Dialogue of Democracy 
1 want to scout a small com er of media scholarship-journalism studies-
where 1 have tried to blend the concerns of cultural studies and dialogic theory. 
My research has focused on the meaning and significance of journalism's talk 
about itself, its public, and the polity it serves. Over and over, the profession has 
metonymically reimagined its public, variously invoking it as audience, mar-
ket, and community. Each attempt to name journalism's purpose casts public 
life in a different light. If we describe journalism as information, we are invit-
ing citizens to consider newsreading a civic duty. If we believe that publicity is 
journalism's source of power, we expect reporters to expose the dark corners of 
public life to scrutiny. If we think of news as little more than gossip, we will 
expect little of it. However we conceptualize journalism, we are likely to fall 
back upon one or an other cognate of dialogue. We may consider journalism a 
form of access, deliberation, or dialogue (Heikkila & Kunelius, 2002), but it is 
all still talk. 
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My writings explore the meanings of our talk about journalism. For 
example, what do we learn about the profession's ethos by studying tbe way it 
demonizes outlaws like Rupert Murdoch (Pauly, 1988), or the public journal-
ism advocates within its ranks (Pauly, 1999), or its lackadaisicaJ readers (Pauly, 
199lb)? How does the profession's talk about itself reveal the social common-
places it holds dear (Pauly & Eckert, 2002)? How does a newspaper assess the 
difference it has made in the life of a community (Pauly, 2003b)? How have 
movements within the profession, such as the New Journalism (Pauly, l990), 
compelled journalists to reconsider their relations with subjects, sources, and 
readers? And what have such movements signified to readers, student journal-
ists, and disaffected professionals (Pauly, 1998a)? By what metaphors should 
we understand the profession's work and the social relations it forges? Is journal-
ism an information utility? A form of storytelling answerable only to the 
narrative instincts of reporters? Ora moral spectacle? What does it mean when 
journalism talks about itself asan art form (Pauly, 2003a)? Or an undeveloped 
medium for social dialogue (Pauly, 1994)? What might we learn from excep-
tional writers, such as Jane Kramer, who have consistently imagined their work 
in different terms (Pauly, 1995, 1998b)? And how might the methods of cul-
tural stud ies help us analyze what and how journalism has signified (Pauly, 
1989, 199la; Jensen & Pauly, 1997)? 
The debate over public journalism aptly illustrates the possibilities and 
difficulties of applying dialogic concepts to media studies. The term public (or 
sometimes civic) journalism refers to a movement in the 1990s to reconnect 
news organizations, especially daily newspapers, to the communities they 
served. In cities like Wichita, Kansas; Charlotte, North Carolina; and 
Columbus, Georgia, journalists began experimenting with election coverage, 
but soon opened their pages to wider-ranging discussions of community life, 
crime, race relations, and city planning. These public journalism projects, as 
they carne to be known, created new rituals of involvement such as community 
forums, focus groups, and neighborhood pizza parties. Looking back at this 
history, Rosen (1999, p. 262) has identified four key traits that he thought had 
character ized the movement: It addressed people as citizens rather tban con-
sumers, it helped them act upon not just learn about community problems, it 
took sorne measure of responsibility for public discourse, and it recognized 
that journalism must "help make public Life go well" if it hoped to earn the 
attention and respect of citizens. 
1 would add one other trait. Public journalism prospered beca use it recog-
nized tha t public discourse about press performance had changed. Professional 
and public dissatisfaction with coverage of the 1988 and 1992 elections pro-
vided the immediate impulse to change, but the steady, long-term decline in 
prestige and centraJity of the daily newspaper also opened editors and 
reporters to ideas they had rejected in the past. The testimony of highly 
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regarded former reporters like Paul Taylor and Richard Harwood underscored 
the seriousness of the crisis. The movement found prominent and successful 
spokesmen in successful and respected small-city newspaper editors-most 
notably Davis "Buzz" Merritt, Jr., of the Wichita Eagle and Cote Campbell of 
the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot and later the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Their enthusi-
asm and friendship lent credibility to the work of }ay Rosen, a professor at 
New York University, who would spearhead the movement. Rosen drew heavily 
on a rich body of theoretical writings on journalism by }ames Carey, first of the 
University of Illinois and more recently at Columbia University. But Rosen also 
found imaginative ways to translate that literature for a professional audience, 
even when his elisions frustrated both professional (Corrigan, 1999) and 
academic critics (Giasser, 1999b). The movement garnered strong support 
from the Knight, Kettering, and Pew foundations, helping Rosen earn a hearing 
for his ideas at industry forums such as the Poynter Institute and the American 
Press Institute. Represen tatives of those institutions, such as David Mathews, 
Ed Fouhy, Jan Schaeffer, and Roy Peter Clark, found ways to hook public 
journalism to their groups' agendas. 
The sch oJarly response to public journalism demonstrates the ways in 
wruch media stuclies habitually resists dialogic approaches. The book created out 
of a 1996 Stanford University conference on "The Idea of Public Journalism" 
(Giasser, l999b), features a number of hard-nosed critiques of the movement. 
Barbie Zelizer (1999) writes that she appreciates the idea of public journalism 
but thinks it has failed to connect itself to the larger professional community and 
its history. John Peters ( l999a) argues that public journalism does not recognize 
that "dialogue is a form of communication whose form is orgarucally connected 
to scale." The dream of democracy as a "grand dialogue of all citizens," he writes, 
is "flawed in compelling ways" (p. 104). Micha el Schudson ( 1999) argues that the 
communal habits encouraged by public journalism are not adequate to public 
life, where citizens must "work out problems among people with few shared val-
ues, little trust, and a feel of anxiety and enmity" (p. 131). Following Nancy 
Fraser and Todd Gitlin's criticisms of a unitary public sphere, Ted Glasser 
(1999a) faults public journalism's quest to create a common cliscursive space in 
which all citizens might meet to discuss public affairs. All these criticisms, well-
grounded and reasonable, position dialogue as an improbable and unworkable 
ideal, certainly as something less politically decisive than professional norms 
(Zelizer}, historical precedent (Peters), institutional structure and procedural 
rules (Schudson), or group interests (Glasser). 
This battle over public journalism matters beca use it broaches larger polít-
ica! questions. From a dialogic perspective, we might ask what we should call 
"the between" in a nation of citizens? A stage for the performance of group 
interests? A forum for policy discussion and ideological dispute? A market for 
the exchange of information? A meeting that makes the town visible to itself as 
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a pulilical entity? Schudson (1997) has noted the ubiquity of one particular 
metaphor---conversation-in the work of many contemporary thinkers, from 
Habermas to Bruce Ackerman, Richard Rorty, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and 
Michael Oakeshott. Recognizing that dialogue and conversation may not 
describe exactly the same activity, [ want to compare Schudson's position with 
that of his most eloquent interlocutor, James Carey. J have chosen Schudson 
and Carey beca use of their prominence and influence in American media stud-
ies. They both frequently write about the role of journalism in democracy, and 
they regularly read and comment on each other's work. Most important, for 
my purposes, neither takes a purely dialogic stance. Theirs is nota pro-and-con 
argument, but rather a struggle to imagine how or why one might incorporate 
dialogue into our theories of democracy. 
Schudson ( 1997) begins by distinguishing two types of conversation that he 
thinks we have conflated. Sociable conversation, he says. "has no end outside 
itself" (p. 299). lt honors the pleasure of social interaction. Problem-solving con-
versation, he says, "finds the justification of talk in its practica! relationship to the 
articuJation of common ends" (p. 300). This second sort of conversation creates 
the space for public reasoning, deliberation, and persuasion. It is not an easy 
space to manage, as it turns out. The possibility of embarrassment keeps many 
from speaking out, even when given the chance (here he borrows from Jane 
Mansbridge's [1980] study of actual participation in New England town meet-
ings). ln homogeneous settings, shared values anda sense of trust may encour-
age speech. ln heterogeneous settings-that is, exactly the sort found in modern 
democracies-the risks are higher and the rewards more uncertain. Schudson 
argues that only sociaJ and political norms, conventions, and resources that 
stand apart from conversation make democracy possible. To make conversation 
work, we must create "ground rules designed to encourage pertinent speaking, 
attentive listening, appropriate simplifications, and widely apportioned speaking 
rights" (p. 307). Deliberation also depends upon inscription-the power of print 
and broadcast materials to fix and disseminate a record. 
Schudson's training as a sociologist shows in this argurnent, as does his early, 
and lately renewed, interest in political science. By his accoun t, society operates 
more powerfully than culture, enabling and constraining members' performances. 
He considers conversation as one mode of democracy, but certainly not its 
essence. As in his book The Good Citizen (1998), he stresses the importance 
of social institutions embedded in particular histories, and this emphasis distin-
guishes him from scholars educated more exclusively in comrnunication tradi-
tions. A few years ago I suggested to Schudson that, for aU his work in media and 
communication, he seemed to be seeking something more than a purely 
communicative perspective. He agreed, saying that he wanted comrnunication 
and something else. In the essay on conversation, rus emphasis on sociological 
context leads him to conclude that sometimes the requirements of democracy 
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may trump those o f conversation. The moment may come, he writes, when we 
need to call a strike o r demonstrate or cease speaking or invite contl ict, if o nJy to 
affirm for others the depth of our convictions (Schudson, 1997). 
One can read this argument on conversation as a reply to Habermas's 
( 1989) conception of a public sphere. Schudson has spelled o ut his objections 
elsewhere, too-in his essay "Was There Ever a Public Sphere?" (Schudson, 
1995, pp. 189-193) and in his recent book on the sociology o f news (Schudson, 
2003 ). But media scholars have interpreted the conversatio n essay as a friendly 
and spirited, if direct and deadly serio us, challenge to Carey's writings about 
dem ocracy and pub lic life. Indeed, Schudson acknowledges that "In commu-
nication stud ies, Jam es Carey has been especially eloquent in placing conversa-
tion at the center of public life and the restoration of a public at the heart o f 
the contempo rary task of democratic society" (Schudson, 1997, p. 298). 
It is not so easy to summarize Carey's work, filled as it is with complexly 
nested arguments, subtle turns of phrase, and Literary allusion. But Carey ( 1997) 
h imself has provided the following summary in his second collection o f essays: 
Communication understood as a metaphor of ritual and conversation encour-
ages, even requires, a primitive form of equality because conversation must leave 
room for response as a condition of its continuance. Conversation enforces a 
recognition of others in the fuUness of their presence. In conversation we must 
deaJ with the fuJI weight of words for they put not only our minds but also our 
bodies in play and al risk. Therefore, to speak conversationaJly is not only to invite 
and requi re a response, but to temper of necessity our criticisms and alienations, 
our objections and differences, with expressions, implicit and explicit of solidarity 
and mutual regard. (p. 315) 
Carey believes that journalism necessarily plays a speciaJ role in any free 
society-a role bequeathed to it by historical ci rcumstancc and custom . 
"Journalism is central to our politics," he writes, "to the power o f the state, to 
our capacity to fo rm livable communities, indeed to our survivability as a 
democratic community" (p. 330) . The purpose of public journaJism, he writes, 
is "nothing less than the re-creat ion of a participant, speaking public, r itually 
fo rmed for democratic purposes, brough t to life via conversation between 
citizen journalists and journaJist citizen s" (p. 338). 
Stated so broadly, Careys concepts of conversatio n, public, and journalism 
may seem vulnerable to Schudson 's theoreticaJ objections and histo ricaJ 
evidence. But Carey insists that he m eans to identify the communicative prac-
tices by which individuals an d societies have imagined the possibilities of 
human freedom. He and Schudson tend to choose different representative 
anecdotes. Schudson stresses the persistence of sociaJ structure, custom, and 
routine, and the historically spccific ways in which new st ructures, customs, 
and routin es emerge. Carey emphasizes m oments of disruption and rebirth. 
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Thus he discovers inklings of public life in the debates over the United States 
constitution, in the samizdat (i.e., clandestine literature) and coded fictions of 
Eastern Europeans, in John Dewey's response to Walter Lipprnann, and, as 
noted above, in public journalisrn. In the spirit of Dewey and the Canadian 
economist Harold Adams lnnis, Carey understands conversation as the oral 
tradition's stand against military adventurism, imperial technology, arrogant 
professionalism, and unencumbered markets. And he values the pedestrian 
everydayness of that tradition. Like Mumford, whose work he read closely in 
the 1960s and 70s, he considers the city a hurnanly rnade container that Lends 
shape and resonance to public life. This, 1 suspect, is one of the things he 
admires about public journalism: its plain cornmitment to making cities work. 
lt is worth noting that neither Schudson nor Carey foregrounds dialogic 
theory. Carey's defense of conversation, quoted above, certainly acknowledges 
the importance of mutuality and positive regard. And yet one feels in Carey's 
position the strong hand of the free expression tradition. What he describes as 
conversation can seem like altemating speaking performances, tempered by 
friendship and civility. He almost never draws upon relational or interpersonal 
thinkers, preferring to keep company with historians, legal scholars, sociolo-
gists, anthropologists, and economists. And despite his commitment to hope, 
possibility, and choice, he readily ack.nowledges the weight of history. 
Schudson's perspective seems, at first glance, unfriendly to dia1ogic theory. 
Within his liberaJ worldview, rules, procedures, and structures matter more 
than communkative forro. As a writer, he comes across as more argumentative 
and less playful, less willing to entertain whimsical or expressive meanings. He 
loves to debunk commonplaces. Nonetheless, his writings contain charming 
moments of personal revelation. In the conversation essay, for exarnplé::, he 
argues that "the romance of conversation" does not acknowledge that rnany 
people (himself included) are slow to speak and do not enjoy deliberative dis-
course or large gatherings. And in his fine book on the history of citizenship, 
which defends a limited, monitoria! conception of citizenship against cornmu-
nitarian calls for more political participation, he opens with a description of 
himself asan election volunteer at his local polling place in California. 
Many media scholars opera te with similarly mixed comrnitments and pur-
poses, making it unlikeJy that dialogic theory will ever displace the dominant 
traditions of media research. But might dialogue play a larger role than it has 
in our discussions of the media? Let me briefly note four areas where media 
studies would profit from closer relations with dialogic theory. 
First, the question of how the media represent the forms of human talk 
remains relatively unexplored. Do the media promete or hinder dialogue by the 
way they represent our processes of conversation, argument, and discourse? Our 
cinema tic images of human talk, for example, model an apparent preference for 
the impassioned speecb, the burble of young love, the gossip of the high school 
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cafetería, and the argument that explodes into a fight. How should a society 
committed to dialogue use popular culture to represent its forms of talk? 
Second, dialogic theory might usefully counterbalance the powerful 
bureaucratic routines and professional norms that govern media production. 
Public journalism has demonstrated that media professionals begin to think 
differently about their work when steadily confronted with the perspectives of 
citizens who stand outside their work routines. Might media organizations 
consciously create more occasions for dialogue-times and places set aside for 
nonroutine talk? Are media professionals capable of suspending their profes-
sional habits Long en ough to probe more deeply the social and political impli-
cations of their work? 
Third, dialogic theory offers an alternative conception of who human 
beings are. Without insisting on a priori normative beliefs, it entertains the 
possibility of creaturely solidarity. In this it differs from the oversocialized con-
ception of human nature found in the social sciences. Media studies, especialJy 
in its critical modes, too easily codes and categorizes individuals in terms of 
social structure, gro up standpoint, and presurned position in hierarchies of 
power. Dialogue hopes for a more fluid, less structured space for human inter-
action . It imagines vulnerability and openness as virtues, a sign of our shared 
existential condition. 
Finally, dialogic theory offers perhaps our best grounding for the study of 
media ethics. Cliff Christians (1977, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1997, 2000; Chr istians, 
Ferré, & Fackler, 1993; De Lima & Christians, 1979) has read and published 
extensively in this vein, pursuing insights from a wide range of social philoso-
phers, including Jacques Ellu1, Martin Buber, Charles Taylor, Paulo Freire, and 
lvan Illich. His work, steadily deepened over the past 20 years, has hada pro-
found influence on scholarship in media ethics. From such seeds new work has 
sprung, such as James Ettema and Theodore Glasser's ( 1998) exemplary study 
of investigative journalists, which combines ethics and organizational analysis. 
Work on practica) and applied ethics by mainstream philosophers has been 
moving in this same direction (e.g., May, 1996), foregrounding communica-
tion practices and identifying responsiveness to others as the indispensable 
requirement of ethical behavior. 
A commitment to dialogue promises practical as well as theoretical conse-
quences. Consider, one last time, the state of American journa1ism. In the after-
math of the events of September 11, Barbie Zelizer and Stuart AJlan (2002) 
solicited and pub1ished essays on press performance by an array of scholars, 
including Rosen, Carey, and Schudson. Wisely and perceptively, the authors 
describe how the profession responded to the crisis, often with renewed enthu-
siasm and sense of purpose. And yet I saw and heard something different. On 
that blindingly clear fall day, journalism hesitated in the face of terror and 
trauma, uncertain of what todo or say, even as armies of reporters and editors 
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were gearing up for lavish, heroic feats of reportage. Dave Eason {1990) has 
noticed a similar uncertainty in the work of New Journalists such as Joan 
Didion, Michael Herr, Hunter Thompson, and Norman Mailer. These 
reporters felt that the enorrnity of cultural change and political upheaval in the 
1960s had outrun their abil ity to tell stories in the usual way. Might we con-
sider journalists' narrative faiJure, in such circumstances, a form of radical 
honesty? O r even a democratic virtue? 
Didion (2003) has recently noted the differences between the responses of 
citizens and the political establishment (including journalists) in the weeks 
after September 1 1. On a West Coast book tour that faJl, Didion said her audi-
ences "recognized that even then, within days after the planes hit, there was a 
good deal of opportunistic ground being seized under cover of the clearly 
urgent need for increased security." Washington, she wro te, "was stilJ talking 
about the protection and perpetuation of its own interests." And her listeners' 
response? "These people got it. They didn't like it. They stood up in public and 
they talked about it" (p. 54). Under such dire circurnstances, citizens turned 
immediately to talk. But were their institutions listening? AlJ too quickly, 
reflection yielded to retribution. At such rnoments, dialogue hopes to call us to 
our better nature, as creatures, as simply human beings. Conceived as a dialogic 
institution (Anderson, Dardenne, & Killenberg, 1994), journalism might have 
opened a nd defended a space for dialogue, where citizens could reflect, speak, 
and be heard. Journalism could have imagined its charge differently-not to 
inform, but to do whatever it couJd to prevent us from forging our portraits of 
grief into declarations of war. 
